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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

PRISONERS AT WAR: THE POW BATTLEGROUND
By
GEORGE S. PRUGH*

From the very earliest times, ever since man has fought man, the problem
of the prisoner of war, the captured enemy, has been a vexing one.' True
enough, our barbaric ancestors solved the problem in a simple, if not satisfactory, manner-the hapless prisoner was usually quickly executed, often even
before leaving the battlefield. But as many historians have told us, there came
about an evolution in the treatment of prisoners. Centuries ago some clever commander saw the value in prisoners, either as slaves or as hostages, and from
that point on the prisoners' lot began to improve-slowly, it is true, and often
with tragic slips into the sanguinary past, but, nonetheless, there was a steady
drift toward eventual restoration into the prisoners' own society. With the advent of the professional soldier, particularly the mercenary, the prisoner could
begin to hope that he would at least be able to survive if he fell into his enemy's
hands-for who could say that in the next war the tables might be turned and
his enemy might then be in his hands? 2 A pattern of improved treatment began to materialize, and by the time of World War I it appears that a definite
body of principles for the treatment of prisoners was actually being followed,
although not without frequent backsliding. This code could trace its ancestry
from certain provisions of the famous U. S. Army General Order 100 of 1863
(the product of German-born Professor Francis Lieber acting under instructions from the United States War Department during the Civil War),S the
Brussels Conference declaration relative to prisoners of war (1874), and the
4
Hague Regulations, annexed to the Hague 'Convention of 1907. Following the
* Major, JAGC U. S. Army; A.B. U. of California; LL.B. Hastings College of the Law,
U. of California; Member of bars of California, U. S. Court of Appeals for 9th Circuit, U. S.
Court of Military Appeals, and U. S. Supreme Court. Member of American Bar Ass'n Sections
on Criminal Law and International and Comparative Law.
1 Detailed studies of the development of the treatment of POWs may be found in: FLORY,
PRISONERS OF WAR (1942). at 10-23; SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND (1911); FOOKS, PRISONERS OF WAR (1924); BORDWELL, THE LAW OF WAR BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS (1908);
for other references see: STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT (1954) 651
and OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW, LAUTERPACHT, (7th ed. 1952) 367.

2 Article of War XIII of Richard II, as early as 1385, stated: "If any one takes a prisoner,
and another shall join him, demanding a part, threatening that otherwise he will kill him (the
prisoner], he shall have no part, although the share be granted to him; and if he kills the said
prisoner he shall be in arrest to the mareschall without being delivered until he has satisfied
the party, and his horses and armour shall be forfeited to the constable."
3 WINTHROP,

MILITARY

LAW

AND

PRECEDENTS,

(2d

ed.

1920

reprint)

788-796,

sets

out

several provisions of General Order 100 and contains much excellent background material, copiously annotated particularly with interesting American incidents to describe the status of prisoners of war.
4 The United States took an early lead in attempting to stipulate by treaty the proper treatment of POWs. On 10 Sept. 1785, Benjamin Franklin signed for this country in a Treaty of
Friendship with Prussia, wherein regulations were set down for the manner of dealing with
prisoners. See 8 STAT. 84, 96 (1785). The same concept was included in treaties with Prussia.
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World Wars, the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949 produced detailed
provisions aimed at ameliorating the hard lot of the prisoners and giving the
various power-parties additional guides for uniform treatment of this problem. 5
Somewhere about the middle of the ninteenth century there had been a pronounced change in the treatment of war captives. Where before the prisoner
either had been destroyed or used as a captured asset, the new aim was that he
should be removed from the fight-he was, when once captured, to be held in
protective custody, the only purpose being to prevent him from further participating in the war.
Of course, history has furnished us with many examples where prisoners
have not, subsequent to capture, been removed from participation in the war
even as combatants. Many of the so-called barbarians, after defeat by the Roman legions, turned to carry their weapons under the banners of those same
legions instead of against them. In the early days of this country, there was
a constant struggle by Americans, falling into the hands of the British, to
keep from having to fight on the side of their former enemy. 6 In the Mexican
War of 1846-1848 and the American Civil War there were some instances of
significant numbers of troops subsequently fighting on the side of their captors. 7 There are stories of great numbers of Ukranians who preferred, after
being captured, to fight with the Germans during World War II against the
Russians. Even in the Korean War there is evidence to indicate South Koreans
were pressed into military service by and for the Communists. 8
in 1799 and 1828 (8 STAT. 162, 174-176, 378-387). On 12 May 1813 the U. S. undertook a
cartel with Great Britain to treat POWs according to the usage and practice of the most civilized nations during the war. The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo of 1848 included an article covering prisoners of war. See R. R. Wilson, Standards of Humanitarianism in War, 34
AM. J. INT'L. L. 320-324 (1940).
5 Major General Allen W. Gullion, later The Judge Advocate General of the Army, was
the senior American member who represented the War Department at the Geneva Conference
in 1929. He remarked: "It has been well said that the kind of treatment accorded prisoners
of war under the conventions is a test of how far a nation has progressed along the road of
civilization." For a brief comment on the POW problem and the 1929 Conventions, see W. P.
Cresson, A New Convention Regarding Prisoners of War, 24 AM. J. INT'L. L. 148 (1930).
An extended note on the 1949 Conventions is found in an article by J. S. Pictet, 45 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 462 (1951).
6 See report of Secretary of State James Monroe, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, 3 FOREIGN REL.
U. S. 597-602 (1814). See also the case of Respublica v. McCarthy, 2 U. S. 86 (1781), dealing with an instance where an American, impressed into the British service, was recaptured by
American forces and tried as a traitor.
7 FOOKS, PRISONERS OF WAR 84 (1924), tells of a battalion of Mexican troops composed
principally of deserters from the U. S. Army. The Mexicans used religious reasoning, "gayly
dressed sirens", special monetary rewards, and anti-American propaganda to induce many privates (mostly foreign born) of the U. S. Army to desert to them. See SMITH, 1, WAR WITH MEXICO 160 (1919). A group of Irishmen, all deserters from the U. S. Army, organized the San Patricio
Artillery Company for the Mexicans. And see WINTHROP, DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL (1866) [Prisoners of War, para. 10, p. 185] dealing with Civil War cases.
8 See 41st Report, UN Command, Period of March 1-15, 1952, U. N. Doc. No. S/2629, 26
DEP'T STATE BULL. 1039 (1952). In a press release of 24 October 1952, (27 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 744), Secretary of State Dean Acheson noted that the Communists had pressed some 53
thousand prisoners of war into the North Korean Army.
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Documents dealing with treatment of prisoners of war have recognized,
at least modernly, that it is improper to force a prisoner to take up armg against
his own side, and so today we find provisions prohibiting such a practice.9
The Geneva Conventions, however, like all forms of written law, must
struggle to keep pace with the devising spirit of man-and it is with this
struggle, as applied to the recent development of prisoner treatment, that this
paper is concerned. For it is now apparent that there is a definite trend backward to the extension of the battlefield into the prisoner of war compound,
to making the captive a prisoner at war rather than of war. 10
The recent Korean "police action" furnished the American press with two
topics about prisoners of war which, characteristically, some of the press sensationalized and distorted so that it is rather difficult to approach the problems
without arousing some rather intense feelings. These two subjects were (1)
the "new" doctrine of "brain-washing", applied by the North Koreans and
Chinese Cclmmunist forces to captured United Nations personnel, and (2) the
Communist POW riots of Koje-Do and Cheju-Do, resulting in one instance
in the "kidnapping" of an American brigadier general. Only a few observers
.seemed to perceive that these two situations were in reality nothing but the logical application of a well-established Communist procedure whereby the prisoners of war, like every other person or thing, must be used to further the interests of the Communists. It is as simple as that.
No one who has studied the history of the Communist growth would be
surprised by this small but significant application of the ideological approach
to the prisoners of war situation." Illustrative of such an approach was the
disintegration of the Russian Army in 1915-1917 and the effect in Germany
immediately after World War I, in large measure attributable to the infection
9 Chapter 3.23, Department of the Army draft of 1 March 1954 of the revised Law of Land
Warfare, states that Article 7, GENEVA CONVENTIONS RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR OF AUGUST 12, 1949, was intended to preclude a prisoner from becoming either
a civilian or a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power. Reference is there made to
FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, 17-18. Article
II B
7, however, merely provides that a POW "may in no circumstances renounce in part or entirety
the rights secured" him by the Convention. Article 130 includes in the category of a "grave
breach" the compelling of a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile power.
10 J. M. Spaight remarked in his book, WAR RIGHTS ON LANID 265 (1911), that "Today the
prisoner of war is a spoilt darling; he is treated with a solicitude for his wants and feelings
which borders on sentimentalism (POW captivity] is usually a halcyon time, a pleasant experience to be nursed fondly in the memory, a kind of inexpensive rest-cure after the wearisome
turmoil of fighting." But Ernst H. Feilchenfeld noted in Prisoners of War (June 1948, Institute of World Polity, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University) that "During the last
50 years profound historical changes have occurred, a few of which are favorable, but most
of which are detrimental to the prisoner of war" (p. 11). Henry Cabot Lodge, referring to
Chinese atrocities in POW camps, called upon the UN Assembly on 30 November 1953, to
help reverse a deterioration in human standards of conduct "which, if not checked, will lead
the world back into the jungle."
11 Both Marx and Engels were exponents of total war, and were likewise well acquainted with
the techniques of subversion and propaganda. See EARLE, MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY 155
(1943) and his excellent chapter, "Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin: Soviet Concepts of War", 322.
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of troops, both German and Russian, by the Communist ideology. It is said that
following the armistice of Brest-Litovsk the revolutionists distributed German
language newspapers Die Fackel (The Torch) and Der Volkerfriede (The People's Peace) to the soldiers of the Central Powers. Edward Mead Earle cites
German Major General Max Hoffman's War Diaries and Other Papers, (1929)
and writes:
"German prisoners of war were indoctrinated and harangued so
effectively that upon their return to the fatherland they were confined
for thirty days in 'political quarantine camps' and mentally 'deloused'
with patriotic literature. Nevertheless, throughout the spring and
summer of 1918 prisoners brought back to Germany the infection bred
of the revolutionary propaganda to which they had been subjected in
Russian prison camps since the November Revolution. They had drunk
deeply of the heady wine of freedom and sedition, they had seen the
[Russian] Army melt away before their eyes, and now they returned
to their depots speaking a new language of peace and bread-and bringing with them a general spirit of insubordination."
This, mind you, when the Communist practices were in their infancy! The
system -became much more refined by the time of World War II, as so well
described by 'Yamamoto' in his book about the experiences of Japanese prisoners of war in Russia from 1945 to 1949.12 Is it so amazing, then, that the

puppets of the Communist world should engage in the same techniques so successfully practiced by the Big Brother? The Korean experiences of United
Nations prisoners follow the dear pattern of Communist treatment of captives,
except that the Communists have endeavored in the elapsing thirty years to
sharpen techniques and to apply them more cleverly.
It cannot be said that the Communists invented the concept that treatment of prisoners of war has a direct bearing upon the future relationship between nations. It was one approach to this notion that originally hastened the
trend to more humane treatment for prisoners of war. As "civilized" nations
desired better conduct toward their people when being held by an enemy it
became necessary to be somewhat more humane toward the captured enemy
troops. This "Golden Rule" theory is especially valuable when wars are being
fought between nations whose people place a high value upon survival, or
where great numbers of prisoners are involved. It is, for example, no mere coincidence that American troops were treated relatively better than troops of
other nations captured by the Germans in World War II, for there were over
a third of a million German prisoners in this country who were at the mercy
of the United States, liable to treatment similar to any the Germans might
12 This Japanese officer,

using a pen-name in order to provide himself some protection from
anticipated vengeance at the hands of his former captors, tells of a pattern of prisoner-handling
that is remarkably similar to that used in North Korea. Unfortunately, his book, entitled
FoUR YEARS IN HELL, was not published until 1952, too late to be of much use in warning
UN troops of what they could expect if captured by the Communists there.
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impose upon American prisoners and actually receiving treatment in accord
with the Geneva Conventions of 1929.18

During World War II, United States officials realized that not only would
our humane conduct toward German prisoners tend to induce decent behavior
by the enemy but that this same good treatment had an ancillary but important
effect in lowering the fighting morale of uncaptured German troops. A man
who fears captivity by a particular nation will resist capture by that nation with
greater vigor than will the man who, being already tired of war, sees in captivity a haven from the suffering of the battlefield.
The officials of this country administering the affairs of prisoners of war
did not ignore the possible post-war aspects of their activities. When peace is
restored after a war, it is better to have the prisoner return to his homeland
with at least an unembittered, if not friendly, attitude towards his former captors. Operating on a completely voluntary basis, there was undertaken in World
War II a comprehensive program of study and training for prisoners of war,
most of whom desired sustenance for minds as well as stomachs. Dean Martin
Tollefson said of this program in 1946:
"An outstanding element in the prisoner of war program, to prevent physical, mental, moral, and intellectual decay of the prisoners,
was the educational and re-educational project conducted on a large scale
during the last two years of the prisoner of war program in the United
States. *

*

* The outstanding purpose of this project was perhaps to

create and develop among prisoners of war in the United States, and
particularly among the German prisoners, the maximum possible understanding of and sympathy for American traditions, institutions, and
ways of life and thought. To force propaganda upon the prisoners would
have been illegal under the Prisoner of War Conventions [Geneva,
1929]. Article 17 thereof, however, provides that so far as possible,

belligerents shall encourage intellectual diversions and sports organ-

ized by the prisoners. * * * Two types of facts were needed [for the

training program]: Those which would educate the prisoner concerning
the power and resources of America and its democracy; and those
which would convince them of the impracticability and viciousness of
the Nazi position.

*

* * Specially selected prisoners of war

. .

. [were]

detained and assigned work to assist in the re-education program and
particularly in the preparation of essential materials. * * * Anti-Nazi

prisoners of war were given a chance to express themselves to tell their
fellow soldiers what was wrong with the Nazi regime."
Dean Tollefson tells in detail of the various techniques used in the training program: group forums, quizzes, films, and special training of instructors
13 John Brown Mason, German Prisoners of War in the United States, 39 AM. J. INT'L L.

198-215 (1945); Dean Tollefson, Enemy Prisoners of War, 32 IOWA L. REV. 51-77 (1946).
Detailed reports of the treatment of enemy prisoners of war in this country during World
War II are found in H. R. REP. No. 1992, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944), pursuant to H. R. 30,
and H. R. REP. No. 728, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), pursuant to H. R. 20. It is interesting
to note that one of the principal questons being inquired into in thest reports was whether
the enemy POWs were being "coddled".
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and of persons who were expected to return to Germany as administrators or
police.

14

Now let us see how the Communists operated in Korea in 1950-1953. Dr.
Henry A. Segal 5 tells us that, to begin with, the Communists exploited the
captive's fear of the unknown, producing a state of emotional confusion in the
prisoner who was encouraged to feel grateful toward his captor for sparing
him from death and torture. Thereafter the prisoners were denied leadership,
systematically disassociated from home ties, and generally isolated from their
former identities. Into this void the Communists stepped, requiring the prisoner to furnish an autobiography, to make full use of "confession and self,
criticism", and then to receive daily doses of propaganda instruction. Dr. Segal
says:
-"Each squad of prisoners received relentless daily propaganda instruction under the supervision of the Communist squacleader and an
'elected' monitor. In an appeal to open-mindedness and American fair
play, men were enjoined to 'just listen to our side of the story'. The
material presented was not ludicrous so as to cause ridicule nor was it
venomous to arouse group hostility. Instead, it concentrated on such
topics as 'the maldistribution of wealth in America', 'racial and class discrimination', and 'America's imperialistic designs in starting the Korean War and threatening the borders of peace-loving Red China'.
The Communists presented themselves as 'being interested in the people
and in peace', a subject dear to the heart of every soldier, particularly
one in an enemy prison camp awaiting repatriation. The principal ego
support given the group was an opportunity to work for peace (certainly
an acceptable gratification). Besides, not to work for peace was to be
an enemy of the people-hence unfit to live! In addition to the supposed privilege of working for peace and for the people, the Communists
also rewarded cooperative individuals with extra creature comforts in the
form of extra privileges, food, cigarettes, etc. Those prisoners who,
for any reason, took an active part in the enemy's indoctrination program were used by the enemy to 'sell' others on the need to take
part. * * *"16
On the United Nations side of the lines, as well, there was zealous activity in the compounds of the enemy POWs held in camps in South Korea. The
UN Command reported in 1951:
"In accordance with Article 38 of the Geneva Conventions [of
1949] relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, intellectual, educational, and recreational pursuits of North Korean and Chinese
14 Tollefson, supra note 13. See alsd H. W. Ehrmann, An Experiment in Political Education-

The POW Schools in the United States, 14 Soc. REV. 304-20 (1947), and a War Department
paper entitled Reorientation Program Seen Through the Eyes of German Prisoners of War,
Special Project Center, Fort Eustis ,Virginia.
15 Major, Medical Corps, U. S. Army; formerly Chief, Neuropsychiatric Evaluation Team,
Medical Section, Provisional Headquarters, Korean Communications Zone. Presently in the
Neuropsychiatric Service, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, D. C.
16 Henry A. Segal, Initial Psychiatric Findings of Recently Repatriated Prisoners of War, 3
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 358-363 (1954).
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Communist Force prisoners of war have been actively encouraged. Instructional centres have been erected in each compound, and four hours
per week of classroom instruction are provided for all prisoners upron
a voluntary basis. Attendance for the weekly reporting period ending
7 September was 68.9 percent. All persons had the opportunity of seeing at least one motion picture programme each week. Radio broadcasts, including news, music, and POW-produced entertainment programmes were available to a majority of the prisoners. Athletics, vocational training, hobbies, and handicrafts are becoming increasingly
popular. Daily and weekly news sheets are provided for the use of all
literate prisoners and reading groups are encouraged for the benefit of
the illiterate."' 7 (Emphasis added.)
Turn for a moment to the other side of the coin-the conduct of prisoners
of war in the enemy prison enclosures. Here, too, as in the battle for the captives' minds, we see the recent trend toward extension of the battle. During
World War II there was for a time a disciplinary problem to be faced by the
United States Army in its control of German prisoners of war. Certain elements of the captured Afrika Korps started a wave of murders and forced
suicides, apparently well and extensively planned. Kangaroo courts existed
briefly, and some attempts were made by the prisoners to extend Nazi law
and indoctrination into the prison camps. American authorities acted quickly,
however, to segregate the prisoners and to prosecute those who had committed
murders of their fellow prisoners. Where the prisoners engaged in strikes or
work delays, the policy of "no work, no eat" was initiated. The Nazi attempt
to extend the battle to the POW compound was almost a complete failure. 18
In contrast, however, is the situation that developed in South Korea in
1951 and 1952 among the approximately 120,000 Communist prisoners of war
held by the United Nations Command. During June, 1952, when attempts were
made to segregate the prisoners, in one compound were found the bodies of
16 murdered prisoners of war, and weapons of many types, including 3,000
spears, 1,000 gasoline grenades, and 4,500 knives. 19
On 18 February 1952 some 1,500 civilian internees in Koje-Do rioted,
necessitating United Nations Command security troops to be called in to restore order.This incident was used by the Communists during the long truce
talks to bolster their position. 20 In March of 1952, some North Korean prisoners of war rioted at Koje-Do, and in May of the same year the Communist
prisoners, holding an American general officer captive for three days, required
17 29th Report of UN Command for period Sept. 1-15, 1951 U. N. Doc. No. S/2400, 25
DEP'T STATE BULL. 1034 (1951). See also 31st Report of UN Command, for period Sept.
16-30, 1951, U. N. Doc. No. S/2432, 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 270 (1951).
18 Tollefson, supra note 13.

19 47th Report of UN Command, for period June 1-15, 1952, U. N. Doc. No. S/2774, 27
DEP'T STATE BULL. 669 (1952).
20 40th Report of UN Command, for period Feb.
DEP'T STATE BULL. 999 (1952).

16-29, 1952, U. N. Doc. No. S/2619, 26
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one regimental combat team to be ordered to Koje-Do to restore order. 2 1 When,
pursuant to the terms of the Truce, it became essential to discover the wishes
of each prisoner with respect to repatriation, Communist leaders in UN Command prisoner of war camps sometimes refused to permit interrogations, inspired disturbances, or acted in various other ways requiring the captors to use
force to maintain control.22 Some plans of pro-Communist Chinese prisoners
of war, intercepted in mid-1952, revealed that the prisoners were to (a) deliberately misunderstand orders, (b) ignore instructions or explanations of camp
supervisory personnel, (c) continue demonstrations and loud noise-making,
and

(d)

continue surreptitious communications between compounds. 23 Civil-

ian internees at Pongan rioted on 14 December 1952-the same day that the
Chinese Communists rejected the United Nations resolution calling for peace
in Korea. Six out of the 8 compounds, holding some 9,200 prisoners, were in2
volved in the riot.

4

The United Nations Command stated that the mutinies by the Communist
prisoners at Koje-Do and Cheju-Do [outbreaks at Cheju-Do occurred in September 1952] 25 were deliberately planned and masterminded by the Communist
delegates at Panmunjom. A press release from the UN command on 28 January 1953 stated:

"The Communist concept of prisoner of war 'fighters' continuing the war within UNC camps is well illustrated by a handwritten
communist summary of the results of the attempted mass breakout
at Pongan-Do on December 14, 1952, in the course of which 85 prisoners lost their lives and 113 were wounded. The summary recognized
that heavy casualties had been expected but that 'our fighting comrades
. . .were determined to die a glorious death'. Although the 'task imposed on us by the party and the fatherland'-which was to break outcould not be fulfilled, the 'main purpose' was to 'develop a class fight
to give the enemy a crushing defeat'."
The press release continues, outlining the Communist method of mass mutinies, riots, breakouts, and direct violence, all designed to produce propaganda
to influence negotiations at the Truce talks or for use throughout the rest of
Asia. 26 The prisoners had organized kangaroo courts, strong arm squads and
21 41st Report of UN Command, for period March

1-15, 1952, U. N. Doc. No. S/2629, 26
DEP'T STATE BULL. 1039 (1952) ; 46th Report of UN Command, foe period May 16-31, 1952,
U. N. Doc. No. S/2768, 27 DEP'T STATE BULL. 496 (1952).
22 Secretary of State Dean Acheson in press release, 24 October 1952, 27 DEP'T STATE BULL. 744.
23 49th Report of UN Command, for period July 1-15, 1952, U. N. Doc. No. S/2805, 27
DEP'T STATE BULL. 884 (1952).
24 Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, in Plenary Session of General Assembly of United Nations,
22 Dec. 1952, 28 DEP'T STATE BULL. 17-29. See also State Dep't press release of 22 Dec. 1952
(#929), 28 DEP'T STATE BULL. 52-54, regarding the report of the Koje-Do incidents by
the International Committee of the Red Cross.
25 54th Report of UN Command, for period Sept. 16-30, 1952, U. N. Doc. No. S/2897, 28
DEP'T STATE BULL. 224, 226 (1953).
26 See also 59th Report of UN Command, for period Dec. 1-15, 1952, U. N. Doc. No. S/2972,

28 DEP'T STATE BULL. 693 (1953), where it is stated: "The prisoner of war disturbance
caused by the communists are directed towards embarrassing the UNC and aimed at reaping
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executioners. Some prisoners were apparently deliberately planted to organize
"cell organization committees" to carry out strikes, protests, and demonstrations.
Ominously, the UN Command noted that the measures permitted under
the Geneva Conventions would not completely destroy the Communist Organization within the compounds. 2 7 A Communist prisoner of war, therefore, had
to be regarded "not as a passive human being in need of care and protection
until he could be returned to his home but as still an active soldier determined
28
to fight on in whatever way his leaders dictated."
This, then, is extension of the war into the prison compound in a very
positive sense-the fighting between the combatants has been continued, even
where the representatives of one side are captors and of the other side are captives.
What sort of battle is this-this fight on the right hand for the minds of
the prisoners being held by one's side and on the left hand for political and
military advantage earned by prisoners in the hands of the other side?
The more dramatic, but probably less significant in the strategic sense,
is the battle for the prisoners' minds. 29 The popular myth of "brainwashing"
credits the Communists with techniques whereby they are able to wipe out or
"wash" from a man's mind those patriotic learnings he may have had prior to
capture and then to substitute in that place the Communistic doctrines. Exaggerated though it is, there is the germ of truth in the idea. By using psychology,
and not too scientifically at that, the Communists have been able to make
some use of their captives in furthering their war aims. The degree of success achieved by the Communists is open to doubt, but it is not at all questioned
that some success has been realized almost every time the techniques have been
seriously applied. If the Communist goal of "brainwashing" in Korea was to
propaganda benefits particularly if the UNC can be forced into a situation where force must
be used to control POWs. On the military side, the POW disturbances are designed to divert UNC forces from front-line duty." Even during Operation Little Switch, when some
sick and wounded prisoners of war were being repatriated from each side, the Communist prisoners acted in concert to embarrass their captors. See 68th Report of UN Command for period April 16-30, 1953, U. N. Doc. No. S/3090, 29 DEP'T STATE BULL. 425 (1953), and the
amusing story by John Sack, A Slow Boat to China, Harpers 33 (March 1955). The demonstrations continued even during the repatriation. "As each group (of Communists] neared
Panmunjom, the returning prisoners, apparently by prearranged plan and on order, gave startingly similar performance by discarding clothing, shouting, and throwing materials at [UNC]
officials" (76th Report of UNC, for period August 16-31, 1953, U. N. Doc. No. S/3185, 30
DEP'T STATE BULL. 652 (1954).
27 The Communist War in POW Camps, 28 DEP'T STATE BULL. 273-275 (1953).

28 57th Report of UN Command, for period Nov. 1-15, 1952, U. N. Doc. No. S/2970, 28
DEP'T STATE BULL. 690 (1953). Herman Phleger, Legal Advisor, Department of State, in an
address before the Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n. on 22 Jan. 1954, remarked that the "Communist
looks upon a prisoner of war as an asset of the military machine * * * The Communist . . .
who falls into the enemy's hands is expected . . . to continue to fight with every means at
his command." (30 DEP'T STATE BULL. 196, 201).
29 Carl E. Lundin, Repatriation of Prisoners of War: The Legal Aid Political Aspects, 39 A.
B. A. J. 559 (1953): "It is on the over-all world-wide cold war that the prisoner problem may
have its greatest impact. Modern war is in part a war of ideologies-a struggle for the mind
of man. And the side which appeals to the reason and captures the mind of an enemy soldier
may often capture his body without further struggle."
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proselyte to Communism it failed almost totally. 80 The "profit" however, came
in the propaganda advantages obtained, even when it was finally apparent to
the Communists themselves that they would not make many converts. Propaganda is of great value everywhere, especially in war, and most especially in
Asia and in all that part of the world adjacent to or behind the Iron Curtain.

Peoples from the Philippines to India and from Poland to Siberia could hear
stories and see pictures of Americans ostensibly accepting the Communist line
and condemning our own. The appeal here was to the great mass of uncer-

tain people or those who may have known about America only by the trickle of
information allowed by the Communists. 81
There is a great natural temptation to want to fight this fire with a similar type of fire, that is, to do unto the enemy at least as well as he is doing
unto us. And when we have more prisoners than he has we find the temptation

almost irresistible. The difficulty with this reaction is that there are some governments on earth that do not care what happens to their people when captured-numbers in such a case mean nothing and so the counteraction is in-

effective. The two combatants may, in any case, find themselves on a sort of
squirrel's ferris wheel, unable to stop the thing without suffering an additional
loss. Nevertheless, there are many who say that if the enemy try to convert our
prisoners of war to communism, we can convert their prisoners of war to democracy. Besides, is it not a good thing to make some friends in the POW
group so that they can be useful when the war ends and they return home?
This way you can gain a position in the enemy's homeland, without even occupying an inch of his ground. Undeniably, this line of reasoning has much
appeal. But let us carry it along a little farther. Any such program, if undertaken at all, ought to be the most efficient possible. Greatest efficiency is ob-

tainable when there is no opposition. Under guise of an educational program
of providing food for starved minds and with intelligent segregation of die80 See Segal, Initial Psychiatric Findings of Recently Repatriated Prisoners of War, supra
note 16, at p. 363. See also the excellent little pamphlet sketching the techniques employed
by the Chinese to permeate every aspect of the prisoner's life with political indoctrination,
British Ministry of Defense, Treatment of British Prisoners of War, (1955). The voluntary
American educational program for German POWs in 1943-1945 achieved a much higher degree of success than the involuntary Chinese Communist program. See the article by Dean Tollefson, supra note 13. Polls of German POWs indicated some 74% of the POWs who took
part in the program left with an appreciation of the value of democracy and a friendly attitude toward their captors. Only 10% remained militantly Nazi. According to figures published in the report of the UN Command on the operation of the Neutral Nations Repatriations Commission, Doc. No. A/2641, U. N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFF REC., 8th Sess., Supp.
18 (1954), of some 120,000 men, about 14,000 Chinese Communist and 7,600 North Korean prisoners of war elected not to return to their homelands, and about 27,000 others
broke out of their camps rather than return to communist control. Certainly the voluntary educational program undertaken for a time in the UN POW camps can claim some credit for this,
81 See statement by Charles W. Mayo, United States Representative to United Nations General Assembly, 26 October 1953 (29 DEP'T STATE BULL. 641) entitled, The Role of Forced
Confessions in the Communist Germ Warfare Propaganda Campaign. Mr. Mayo noted that "Communist treatment of prisoners of war both in World War II and in Korea has consistently followed a policy of using these persons to advance the military, eqoriomic, and especially the political objectives of Soviet Communist polioy" (p. 646).
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hards from the likely prospects, it requires only a silencing of adverse views,
coupled with a constant indoctrination of the acceptable views, to put the program under way. The tactics used thereafter are limited only by the ingenuity,
resources, and morality of the nation undertaking the program.
Naturally both sides will justify their use of techniques, will claim that
the captives being indoctrinated do so voluntarily, and will vehemently deny
any attempt at wrong-doing in the program. Whether one, both, or neither of
the combatants is telling the truth about this is immaterial. The important thing
is that the program is under way at all.
Now let us turn once again to the second side. Suppose one combatant rationalizes that since the enemy fights in the prison camps by "brainwashing"
prisoners then those prisoners must be urged to fight back. This may take an
active or passive course. A passive course would be to undertake all the little
things that will annoy a captor like delays, sit-down strikes, work-slowups, and
so forth. Such action is permissible and legal. Active methods would include
riots, violence, destruction, sabotage, et cetera. This action is not permissible and
is illegal. Certainly, it is true that at some point some captor nation may, in
frustration, feel justified in saying that the recalcitrant captive, engaged in such
violent active methods suggested above, is beyond the pale as a prisoner of war
and is no longer entitled to POW status.82 But civilized nations will always be
reluctant to undertake severe punishment of prisoners on a large scale, and even
if such a course was decided upon it would require such an amount of force
that in itself it would contribute at least to partial fulfillment of the enemy's
mission by draining some of the strength of the holding nation.
Much earlier it probably occurred to the reader that the present Prisoner of
War Convention assuredly prohibits a program which would almost inevitably
lead to utter destruction of prisoner safeguards. Clearly it was intended in the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August
12, 1949, 88 that prisoners would not be so abused and would in turn not so
abuse their status as prisoners. For example, Article 3 describes minimum treatment and prohibits certain acts: use of violence, use of prisoners as hostages,
outrages on the personal dignity, and sentences except by regularly constituted
courts. Article 7 provides that a POW may in no circumstances renounce in
part or entirety the rights secured by the Convention. Article 13 requires humane
treatment and prohibits certain acts such as unlawfully causing death or seriously
endangering health; subjecting a prisoner to medical or scientific experiments;
82 SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND

(1911),

says that the POW's immunity depends upon

the condition that he must not take any part whatsover in combat. "[I)f he continues to resist he becomes again an active enemy and may be killed. . . . If a POW makes himself
dangerous he loses his privileges as such" (p. 266). But it seems clear that the Geneva Conventions of 1949 intended that a POW could never be deprived of the benefits of the POW
convention. See Articles 5, 6, 7, 82, 85, 92, 98, 108 and 115, CONVENTION FOR THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR.
Exa8 Set out in DEP'T. ARMY PAMPHLET No. 20-150 (October 1950); SENATE DOCUMENTS
EcUTIvE D, E, F, and G, 82d Coag., 1st Sesm.
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exposing a prisoner to violence, intimidation, insults, or public curiosity. Article 17 provides in part that no physical or mental torture, nor any other form
of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Article 130 declares it a "grave breach" to compel a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile power.
It is Article 38, however, which gives the toehold to the indoctrination
program: "While respecting the individual preferences of every prisoner, the
Detaining Power shall encourage the practice of intellectual, educational, and
recreational pursuits ..."
The cautionary phrase relating to the individual preferences is of little real
value as a safeguard against abuses the like of which United Nations personnel
suffered in the prison camps in North Korea. The point of the Communists "enlightened" approach is that the prisoner is made to prefer to take part in the
indoctrination program. After all, it is much more effective to have indoctrinees
who are being indoctrinated because they want to be a part of the program
than those who do it only because of the primal brute force exercised by the
captors. The motivation for the prisoners can come from many things, not the
least of which is simply boredom. 34 Some may undertake it to obtain better
food or better working conditions. To withhold adequate food or to impose
working conditions inimical to the health and safety of the prisoners would
violate the conventions, but what is the violation where the adequate is made
slightly better if the indoctrination program is accepted? Is there any Convention violated if a life of relative ease is offered as a replacement for hard
physical labor, the price being merely the taking part in the indoctrination program?
Nations have always accepted interrogation of prisoners of war as a lawful
action by a captor nation.8 5 If a prisoner chooses to betray his fatherland in such
an interrogation there is no violation of a Convention, unless, of course, the
interrogators have used some illegal means, like physical or mental torture,
34 Walter A. Lunden wrote an interesting article entitled Captivity Psychosis Among Prisoners

of
War, 39 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 721-733
,'stir craze" as a result of confinement,

(1949). He describes the development of
inactivity and isolation. He tells of the effects of the
"abrasion of time" and states: "He [the POW] is stripped of his reputation, his prestige and
often his rank. The psychological effect of the propaganda of his own army fades into thin
air and he becomes keenly aware of the power and force of the enemy, In some stockades the
captors make special efforts to disabuse the minds of the prisoners of any and all ideas of
the glory of his own army or the justness of the cause for which he is fighting" (p. 727).
35 Spaight, supra note 32, at p. 289, says: "Prisoners often constitute a valuable source of
information of which an enemy would be quixotic to fail to take advantage. There is nothing
to forbid his rewarding an obligingly garrulous prisoner, but he [the captor) must not penalize one who refuses to state anything more than what ... [is] required", and at p. 290
he quotes Professor Ariga: "The Army which has captured a prisoner may quite properly employ all means, provided they are humane, to obtain from him as much information as pos-

sible regarding the enemy's movements. . . . We do not think that it will even be possible
to limit the liberty of action of an Army in field, by limiting the right to question prisoners
of war."
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to induce the divulgence of information. 3 6 Where a prisoner may be held captive for a long period-stretching into years-it becomes less necessary to resort to the crude methods of physical torture. And the term "mental torture"
may be rather difficult to interpret in a court of law. Treason or at least some
form of aid to the enemy can be extracted from the prisoner without brute
force, violating the literal meaning of any current prohibition, or even using
trickery. It is not necessary to resort to horrifying tactics, such as those practiced
by the Communists or envisioned by some of the more sensational of the Fourth
Estate, in order to "break" a prisoner.8 7 Given enough time and ingenuity, and
many [not all, and seldom even most] prisoners will furnish the enemy some
aid and comfort as a result of an intellectual, educational, and recreational program broadly tolerated by the Geneva Conventions.
Attempts have been made before to write into the conventions some prohibition against what is currently called "brainwashing". William E. S. Flory,
writing in 1942 in his book, Prisoners of War, a most important work in this
field, said:
"The efforts at 'denationalization' conducted during the World
War and the post-war recognition of the place of propaganda in wartime
apparently caused some of the delegates to the con erence of 1929 [at
Geneva] to attempt to throw up safeguards against future efforts. The
Spanish delegation proposed an additional clause whereby the detaining state would be forbidden to engage in 'religious propaganda'. M.
Riad of Egypt observed that freedom extended by the convention of 1929
would be meaningless if the agreement did not forbid propaganda which
had as its aim the dissemination of ideas contrary to the prisoners' relig88
ion. However, these ideas were not incorporated in the text of the code."
Perusal of the Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva, of
1949 fails to reveal that this matter was discussed in any manner, although there
is some discussion concerning Article 7, wherein it is forbidden to coerce a
prisoner of war to abandon rights given him under the Convention, and Article 99, which prohibits moral or physical coercion to be exerted on a prisoner
of war to induce him to admit himself guilty of an act of which he is accused
86 In the war crimes trial of Weizsaeeker, decided in 1949, the U. S. Military Tribunal at
Nuremburg held that the prohibition against the employment of POWs in connection with war
operations did not impose upon the Detaining Power the duty to refrain from using the voluntary services-including those amounting to treason-of the POW. See transcript, p. 28564.
OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW, LAUTERPACHT 426 (7th ed. 1952). See also L. B. Schapiro, Repatriation of Deserters, 29 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 310, 323 (1952): "In any war in which
the ideological element enters the appeal to the enemys soldiers to desert is a powerful and
lawful means of warfare, and belligerents are unlikely to forego it in the future."
P7 Not all of the abominable techniques used on prisoners by the Communists were the imaginations of press reporters. See the detailed statement of Ernest A. Gross, Representative
to the General Assembly of the U. N., 27 March and 8 April 1953, 28 DEP'T STATE BULL.
612, 614, where he describes the methods used to break spirits and compel the innocent to confess. Prolonged deprivation of sleep, injections of truth serum, enforced maintenance of rigid
positions for long periods, and similar physical and psychological measures are among those
mentioned.
88 FLORY, PRISONERS OF WAR, 86 (1942).
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by his captors. While they touch the fringes of the problem, neither of these
articles goes far enough.
Thus we see that while the Convention prohibited many of the acts which
a Detaining Power might commit against a prisoner, here, in the battle for the
captive's mind, we find only incidental or partial injunctions. Each existing rule
might be complied with but still the captor is left in position to take advantage of the prisoner's incarceration and then to use that advantage in furthering the Detaining Power's war effort. This situation cannot be permitted if the
nations of the world still wish to adhere to what appears to be an eminently
sound theory that a prisoner of war is to be removed from further participation in the war. Likewise, if a captor, endeavoring to adhere to the Convention,
must suffer certain disadvantages directly affecting his war effort the Convention cannot long expect to receive the respect it deserves. It is clear, then, that
observation of the key provisions of the Convention depends upon keeping the prisoners out of the fight and off the battleground, either as victims
or as aggressors. The Convention must, if it is to be much more than a pious
declaration, prohibit perversion of the POW status. At the conclusion of any
war, those nations and individuals who have violated these rules must be ferreted out and brought to account for their misuse of the prisoner status.
There are probably many who will say that this is too difficult an, area for
the Convention to cover, but that even if some line could be drawn between
permitted and prohibited conduct relating to "brainwashing" it is doubtful if
it could be enforced anyway. 39 It is regretable but there is much truth in this.
However, if the same attitude was applied to all of the prisoner of war problems, there would be no conventions at all, and certainly the lot of the prisoner would be that much worse as a result. Each statute of this type on the
books makes it that much more difficult for a nation to tolerate abuse of the
prisoner of war.4 0 And in the face of the well-established precedents for war
crimes trials no nation can ignore the conventions without running the risk that
at some time it and its participating officials will face the bar of international
justice. 4' It is necessary, then, to set forth some prohibition and to state it in
89 S. E. Edmond's provocative article, Laws of War, 15 VA. L. REv. 321-349 (1929) outlines what he has pictured as the collapse of such a concept as a law of war.
40 This might be said to be dealing with the creative and ascertaining aspects of the law, rather
than its enforcement. See Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Operations of the Law of War, 30
BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 206, 212 (1953).

41 Major R.R. Baxter, The Municipal and International Law Basis of jurisdiction over War
Crimes, 28 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 382, 390 (1951) writes: "Acts against any of these persons
[POWs) by whomsoever committed, which are in violation of those fundamental principles of
the law of war which forbid the infliction of unnecessary suffering and the creation of conditions which make impossible the restoration of peace therefore constitute war crimes." Indictments of certain Nazi programs in the International War Crimes Trials at Nuremburg included the charge that Germany had bribed, debased, and incited to treason the citizens and
subjects of other nations for the purpose of establishing the fifth columns of corruption and
sabotage within those nations. See Report of Robert H. Jackson on the International Conference on Military Trials, 1945, 49 (1947). See also Sheldon Glueck, The Nuremburg Trial
and Aggressive War, 59 HARV. L. REv. 396, 432 (1946). After World War I the Allies re-

1956

PRISONERS AT WAR: THE POW BATTLEGROUND

137

the conventions with the utmost clarity. It must be broad enough to be interpreted to cover both aspects of the problem: it must prohibit abuse of the prisoner of war by unfairly encouraging him to treason or conduct related thereto and it must prohibit the encouragment of nationals, when captured, to continue to carry on the fight against the enemy, at least in active or violent methods which require something more than the reasonable and expected restraint,
supervision, and logistical support. Here, then, is an attempt to draft an article
designed to prohibit such conduct:
Each power is prohibited from using, inducing, enticing, persuading,
or forcing any person while in a prisoner of war status, either in the
hands of that power or in the hands of its enemy, to engage in any
form of warfare, including psychological, ideological and propaganda
42
warfare, in any capacity.
It is not intended that this would inhibit the humane employment of means
designed to obtain from a prisoner as much information as possible regarding
the enemy. It would be quite unrealistic to try to limit "the liberty of action of
an army in the field, by limiting the right to question prisoners of war." Similarly, it is not intended that this would prohibit making an appeal to the enemy's
soldiers to desert-providing that the soldiers being appealed to are on the
other side of the Main Line of Resistance, and not a captive audience sitting
out the war in a prisoner of war compound. By using the term "warfare" it is
thought that the minor harassments of captors by captives could be excludedit is not "warfare" for a prisoner to want to and try to escape, or to walk
slower than he was ordered to do, or to fail to obey promptly some order. It
is "warfare", however, where prisoners act in concert to riot or stage a mass
break-out or commit significant sabotage.
Finally, it is recognized that such an article is a
one party might abide by the spirit of the article,
example, punish prisoners of war for violation
some small act is committed. That is a risk that for

double-edged sword. While
the other party might, for
of the Convention when
the present must be run.

It should, however, be unnecessary for any captor nation to resort to drastic methods in order to keep the prisoners under control for there are at hand
sufficient powers permitted under the Convention to cope with the small annoyances, the "passive" opposition by the captives. It may segregate, guard
closely, and discipline for such infractions.

ferred certain war crimes cases

to the Supreme Court at Leipzig, Germany, for trial. See

HACKWORTH, 6 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 279-280.

42 Dealing with a. narrower matter in form somewhat allied to this, Article 51 of the 1949
Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War states in pertinent part:
"No pressure or propaganda which aims at securing voluntary enlistment is permitted." The
salutary simplicity of this form is, however, not felt to be explicit enough for the broad prohibition desired to be accomplished by the draft proposed.
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It may be, however, that the draft effort is unsatisfactory. Possibly it is
too naive, or too sweeping and unrealistic, for nations involved in death-struggles to observe. There may be other objections not discernible in the eyes of a
tolerant parent. It might even be said that the approach is totally wrong because it is only effective to deprive the moral nation of the weapon-the immoral nation will use it anyway, and probably will do so with impunity if
the war ends either in a stalemate without subsequent war crimes trials or
48
in victory for the immoral nation.
That this effort will not do the job, however, does not mean that the matter should be allowed to rest there. As Pitman B. Potter observed in 1953 in
connection with his study of the repatriation problem of prisoners of war:
"What is necessary above all, of course, as soon as conditions permit, is another review of the whole problem of the treatment of 'prisoners of war'."

44

Those of us who, as professional soldiers or as lawyers, labor in the field
occupied by war and conflicts of nations, can but add to that statement a
fervent "Amen".
43 "It is good to be decent. It is good to use proper discretion. It is good to observe the decencies of international law. But it is a fact that against uncivilized people who do not know
international law and do not observe it, and who would take advantage of one who did, there
must be something else." So wrote Capt. Elbridge Colby in his treatise, How to Fight Savage
Tribes, 21 AM. J. INT'L. L. 279, 287 (1927).
44 Pitman B. Potter, Repatriation of Korean Prisoners of War, 47 AM. J. INT'L. L. 661 (1953).

